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INTRODUCTION 
either wUolly inaccurate or very misleading. For example, they assert mat Donald 
RawlingS did not refute the testimony of Dwayne Railings and LaRell Rawlings that 
their fattier said, in Donald's presence, that the property was being conveyed to Donald 
to hold for the family. In reality, Donald testified as follows: 
Q. Mr. Rawlings, at any time between the time when you 
learned that your father had cancer and the date of the 
deed on March 24, 1967, did your father indicate to 
you that he was deeding the property to you to hold for 
anyone else? 
A. He did not. 
(R. 1451 Trans. Vol. IV at p. 653.) 
With regard to the alleged conversation between LaRell, Arnold and Donald in a 
Salt Lake restaurant, he testified as follows: 
Q. While you were in there, in the cafe, what was said by 
your father or LaRell in your presence? 
A. We were just eating and talking. 
Q. Do you recall what he said about the transfer of the 
property? 
A. He didn't mention that while I was there. 
(R. 1451 Trans. Vol. Ill at p. 482.) 
1 
Third party plaintiffs indicate that in 1971 Cleo Rawlings paid taxes on the farm. 
They fail to point out that such payment was for taxes assessed in 1966, prior to 
appellants' ownership of the property. (Exhibit 59.) 
They also assert that Donald distributed proceeds from the resolution of the 
boundary dispute "thereby acknowledging his role of holding the farm for the benefit of 
the family." (Brief of third party plaintiffs LaRell and Bryce Rawlings and Carol 
Masterson at p. 5.) They fail to acknowledge that what was offered to the four siblings 
was $2,100.00, in total, from a recovery of $52,000.00. 
While these factual inaccuracies are not crucial to the appropriate disposition of 
this appeal, they do highlight the unwillingness of third party plaintiffs to address the 
issues in light of the evidence as it was actually presented. 
POINT I APPELLANTS HAVE NO BURDEN TO MARSHAL 
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF FACTUAL FINDINGS THE 
TRIAL COURT DID NOT MAKE. 
Each of the third party plaintiffs assail the appellants for the asserted failure to 
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's finding of the existence of a 
confidential relationship between Arnold Rawlings and the appellants. This is a puzzling 
assertion because the trial court made no such finding. While appellants have argued that 
such a finding is a mandatory predicate to the validity of the court's determination to 
impose a constructive trust, there is no such finding for which appellants would be 
required to marshal the evidence. "[T]he marshaling requirement applies only to 
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challenges of factual findings, not to conclusions of law." Eggert v. Wasatch Energy 
Corp.. 2004 UT 28 f 37, 94 P.3d 193, 203 (Utah 2004). 
It is also significant that the trial court made no finding that Arnold Rawlings 
intended the deed to Donald and Jeanette Rawlings to be a conveyance in trust for the 
family. Such a finding is also a predicate to the imposition 0f a constructive trust. See 
Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 151 (Utah 1987), wherein the Cburt noted what was required 
for the imposition of a constructive trust to conform with thd intent of the grantor. 
A constructive trust is an equitable remedy which arises by 
operation of law to prevent unjust enrichment. Accordingly, 
parol evidence may be introduced to establish a constructive 
trust. If the evidence is of a clear and convincing nature such 
that the remedy should be granted, the trial coi^ rt may alter a 
deed which is regular in form and presumed to convey clear 
title. 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 45 (1957) provides, in pertinent part: 
Effect of Failure of Oral Trust for a Third Person 
(1) Where the owner of an interest in land transfers it inter 
vivos to another in trust for a third person, but no 
memorandum properly evidencing the intention to 
create a trust is signed, as required by the Statute of 
Frauds, and the transferee refuses to perform the trust, 
the transferee holds the interest upon a cpnstructive 
trust for the third person, if, but on if, 
(b) The Transferee at the time of the transfer 
was in a confidential relation to tl}e 
transferor. 
In Parks v. Zions First National Bank, the Court construed 
Section 44, Restatement (Second) of Trusts, as tyeing 
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applicable only to those cases arising out of express trusts. 
The reasoning stated therein is without doubt applicable to 
section 45, and dictum in that opinion so states. 
In Parks, we described an express trust as a fiduciary 
relationship with respect to property, arising as a result of a 
manifestation of intent to create it and subjecting the person 
in whom title is vested to equitable duties to deal with it for 
the benefit of others. 
733 P.2d at 150-51 (emphasis added). See, also, Haws v. Jensen. 209 P.2d 229 (Utah 
1949); Nielson v. Rasmussen. 558 P.2d 511 (Utah 1976). 
In the instant case, the Court did not find that Arnold intended a trust to arise in 
favor of the family, which failure is fatal to the decision to impose a constructive trust. 
Appellants detailed the evidence below not as a challenge to findings made by the 
court but rather to demonstrate that on the basis of the evidence presented the court could 
not have made the requisite findings necessary for the imposition of a constructive trust. 
Accordingly, the conclusion of law that a constructive trust was warranted can be 
reviewed by this Court and reversed, and not merely vacated, if unsupported by the 
evidence offered at trial. Bailev v. Call 767 P.2d 138 (Utah App. 1989). 
The trial court's finding (62) that Arnold Rawlings did not consider the 
conveyance in 1967 to be a transfer of his ownership in the property is of no legal 
significance. Utah law is clear that 
if valid on its face, the presumption is that the deed conveys 
fee title. Absent fraud, duress, mistake or the like attributable 
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to the grantee, a competent grantor will not be permitted to 
attack or impeach his own deed. 
Barlow. Inc. v. Commercial Sec. Bank, 723 P.2d 398, 401 (TpTtah 1986) See also, Mattes 
v. Olearin, 759 P.2d 1177 (Utah App. 1988) (holding that wife and husband were not in a 
confidential relationship and wife could not, therefore, question the validity of her deed to 
her husband). Even during his own lifetime Arnold would not have been able to question 
the validity of the 1967 deed and he never sought to do so. 
While third party plaintiffs have asserted (and the trial court found) that the reason 
the conveyance was made to Donald and Jeanette was to get the property out of Arnold's 
name, this assertion is meaningless. If the conveyance was valid the motivation for the 
conveyance is of no significance. Indeed, in Mattes, supra, the plaintiff testified that the 
reason she conveyed her home to her husband was to avoid claims of her former 
husband's creditors. Id. at 1179. That motivation had no affect on the validity of her 
conveyance. 
Third party plaintiffs submitted, and the court below adopted, a hodgepodge of 
factual findings which is no way speak to the legal issue presented; namely, whether the 
third party plaintiffs presented clear and convincing evidence that Arnold Rawlings 
intended his 1967 warranty deed to be a conveyance in trust and did so at a time when he 
was in a confidential relationship with the grantees. The court below found neither of 
these facts and the evidence offered at trial was not susceptible to making such findings. 
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In point of fact, the court's finding that Arnold did not consider the 1967 deed to 
be any form of transfer of his ownership interest, which finding has not been challenged 
by third party plaintiffs, expressly negates their contention that the deed was intended by 
Arnold to be a conveyance in trust and is fatal to any such claim. 
POINT II IN THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING 
OF AN ORAL EXPRESS TRUST THERE IS NO BASIS FOR 
THE IMPOSITION OF A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST. 
Both in the court below and in this Court, the third party plaintiffs have suggested 
that a constructive trust could be imposed to prevent the "unjust enrichment" of Donald 
and Jeanette Rawlings under an unspecified "more general form of pure equity." (Brief 
of LaRell Rawlings, Bryce Rawlings and Carol Masterson at p. 20.) The flaw in this 
argument is that the third party plaintiffs don't identify any reason why the conveyance 
from Arnold Rawlings to Donald and Jeanette was in any way wrongful. As previously 
noted by appellants, under Utah law the 
[o]wner of property has a right to dispose of it during his 
lifetime as he sees fit, even though his act may, in itself, seem 
to be unfair and unreasonable with reference to the interest of 
other children than the one to whom the conveyance is made. 
Frovd v. Barnhurst 28 P.2d 135, 136 (Utah 1934). 
Third party plaintiffs have offered no explanation of how a conveyance to one 
child and not another could be said to constitute an unjust enrichment of the child 
receiving the conveyance. Invoking something referred to as "pure equity" is not a 
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substitute for demonstrating facts recognized by the law as a basis for imposition of a 
constructive trust. 
The contention that third party plaintiffs were misled into executing quit claim 
deeds in 1974 is of no moment. The third party plaintiffs had no interest in the property 
they quit claimed in 1974 and, therefore, lost nothing as a result of the alleged fraud. If 
the 1967 deed from Arnold to Donald and Jeanette wasn't intended as a conveyance in 
trust for the family, then the third party plaintiffs had no colorable interest of any nature 
in the property they refer to as "the farm" and could not hav^ suffered any loss by 
renouncing any such nonexistent interest. 
POINT III THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM IS BARRED BY THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
In 1980, Donald and Jeanette Rawlings conveyed a portion of the property 
allegedly held in trust and kept approximately $40,000.00 of the $52,000.00 they received 
as consideration. The third party plaintiffs were clearly put on notice by this conduct that 
appellants were not treating the property as trust property held for their benefit. The 
statute of limitations begins to run against a party who has knowledge or through 
reasonable investigation could have acquired knowledge that a purported trustee was not 
acting for the benefit of an alleged beneficiaries of a trust. Snow v. Rudd, 2000 UT 20 
Tf 11. Third party plaintiffs had knowledge in 1980 that put them on notice to determine if 
Donald's actions were consistent with the existence of a trust, Instead, they waited an 
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additional seventeen years before commencing the present action without so much as 
even asking Donald about the distribution of the proceeds of the sale of part of the 
property. 
To the extent third party plaintiffs are now asserting that a constructive trust is an 
appropriate remedy not for a failed oral express trust but rather for some unspecified 
"unjust enrichment" in the acquisition of the property, this cause of action is subject to a 
four year statute of limitations. See Russell/Packard Development, Inc. v. Carson, 2003 
UT App. 316. In the absence of an express trust, the statute began to run on the date the 
deed was delivered. See Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 631 (Utah 1984) (holding that a claim 
that a deed wasn't intended as a conveyance must be brought within 4 years of delivery of 
deed). Accordingly, any claim for unjust enrichment was barred 26 years before the 
present action was filed. 
POINT IV THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN AWARDING SANCTIONS 
While the third party plaintiffs assert that Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 lb-5(3)(p) 
authorizes sanctions for failure to participate in mediation in good faith, such is not the 
case. The statute merely authorizes the Judicial Council to promulgate rules. The actual 
rules only authorize the imposition of sanctions against absent parties. See Rule 101(h) 
of the Utah Rules of Alternative Dispute Resolution. Appellants appeared at the 
mediation. Accordingly, it was an abuse of discretion for the Court to impose sanctions. 
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There is an additional reason why sanctions should not have been awarded on the 
basis of counsel's affidavits about what transpired in the mediation. As the Utah 
Supreme Court recently held in Reese v. Tingev Const., 2008 UT 7, 177 P.3d 605 (Utah 
2008), mediation proceedings are confidential and counsel is not permitted to disclose to 
"any court, in argument, briefs, or otherwise, statements or comments made during the [ ] 
mediation." kL at ^ 11. 
Appellants admit that this issue was not raised below but assert that the Court's 
consideration of affidavits which violate the statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-31b-8(4) 
(Rep.Vol. 9 2002), and this Court's prior holding in Lyons v. Booker, 982 P.2d 1142 
(Utah App. 1999) (quoted in Reese, supra), constitutes plain error warranting reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
Under Utah law, the only way a deed, absolute on its fact, can be held to be a 
conveyance in trust is if it is established by evidence leaving no doubt that such was the 
grantor's intent and that the grantor was in a confidential relationship with the grantee. 
No such evidence was presented in this case and the judgment entered below should be 
reversed. 
DATED this ^ \ ^day of April, 2008. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
By 
M. David Eckersley 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Aj5pellants 
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